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LIABILITY FOR ALL, PRIVACY FOR NONE:
THE CONUNDRUM OF PROTECTING
PRIVACY RIGHTS IN A PERVASIVELY
ELECTRONIC WORLD
Frederick M. Joyce and Andrew E. Bigart*
I. INTRODUCTION
Electronic communications technology in our nation is no longer
merely pervasive, it is ubiquitous. We drive to work in automobiles that
allow us to navigate via GPS, communicate with wireless phone systems,
and, if faced with an emergency, contact an emergency help center at the
push of a button. At the office, we spend our days sending emails or
engaging in telephone conversations with employer-provided
computers, hand-held devices, and wireless and wireline telephones.
Back home, we relax by talking to friends and family on cellular phones,
sending text messages, and editing Internet blog postings.
While the benefits of advanced communications technology are
apparent, there is a dawning realization that the spread of these
technologies at home and at work may have come at a price. The fact is
that every time we venture into this ubiquitous electronic world, the
odds are high that the government, or someone, may be monitoring or
recording all of our communications and movements.
This Article examines how a wide array of federal laws such as the
Wiretap Act,1 the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act2
(“CALEA”), the Electronic Communications Privacy Act3 (“ECPA”), the
Stored Communications Act4 (“SCA”), and the Foreign Intelligence

Frederick “Rick” M. Joyce is chair of the Communications Group at Venable LLP law
firm in Washington, D.C.
His telecommunications work includes domestic and
international telecom regulations and treaties, appellate and civil litigation matters, and
state and federal communications legislation, with a particular emphasis on wireless
communications and electronic media. Andrew E. Bigart is an associate in the Regulatory
Group at Venable LLP.
1
Wire and Electronic Communications Interception and Interception of Oral
Communications, ch. 119, Pub. L. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 2511 (2000)).
2
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, ch. 9, Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108
Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2511; 47 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000)).
3
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, ch. 119, Pub. L. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848
(1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2510)).
4
18 U.S.C. § 2701.
*
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Surveillance Act5 (“FISA”), not only permit the government to monitor
and intercept electronic communications and data, but also place a duty
on businesses to cooperate with these investigative efforts. These laws,
originally intended to strike a reasonable balance between privacy rights
and law enforcement needs, did not anticipate heightened “Homeland
Security” concerns or the recent technological revolution. Consequently,
the current state of the law has left government, businesses, and private
citizens without a clear sense of their legal rights, obligations, and
liabilities.
A. Privacy Risks in an Increasingly Electronic World
Over the past decade, U.S. courts have struggled to apply this
complex array of electronic privacy laws to an equally complex if not
bewildering array of communications technologies and applications.
Previously, courts dealt mainly with conventional telephone wiretaps
under these statutes; today, courts must apply decades-old law to a wide
range of emerging technologies including cellular telephones, Internet
communications, email, blogs, instant messaging, voice over internet
protocol (“VOIP”) communications, packet-sniffing systems, keylogging
programs, and other emerging technologies.6
Businesses face similar dilemmas in trying to strike a reasonable
balance between the obvious benefits of providing employees with
comprehensive electronic communications tools, versus the risk that the
electronic activities of their employees could lead to legal liability or
network harm for the enterprise. Employers, not unlike modern courts,
struggle to understand electronic privacy laws to the point where the
purchase and deployment of ostensibly useful electronic devices can be
constrained by concerns about potential legal liability.
This nascent conflict between electronic privacy laws and
communications technology has led to two disturbing trends. First,
without clear legal limits, the government has begun to expand its
electronic surveillance operations to a degree not contemplated by the
original laws or supported by the majority of U.S. citizens.7 Second, this
5
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978)
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (2000)).
6
See e.g., Casey Holland, Note, Neither Big Brother Nor Dead Brother: The Need for a New
Fourth Amendment Standard Applying to Emerging Technologies, 94 KY. L.J. 393, 394-95 (2005).
7
David Jefferson, NEWSWEEK Poll: American’s Wary of NSA Spying, Newsweek (Web
Exclusive), May 14, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12771821/site/newsweek.
“According to the latest NEWSWEEK poll, 53 percent of Americans think the NSA’s
surveillance program ‘goes too far in invading people’s privacy,’ while 41 percent see it as
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confusing and uncertain legal landscape makes compliance with the law
virtually impossible, to the extent that anyone who endeavors to comply
with electronic privacy laws may nevertheless end up in court.
B. NSA Surveillance Cases Raise the Stakes
The recent ruckus over the National Security Agency’s (“NSA”)
warrantless electronic surveillance program reflects a troubling
escalation of this electronic privacy conflict. According to publicly
available information, these NSA surveillance programs involved
intercepting conversations or mining customer data without first
obtaining court authority as arguably required by statute.8 The first NSA
program involved the monitoring of virtually all international telephone
communications in order to identify potential terrorists.9 The other
program involved NSA requests to telephone carriers that they turn over
all customer call records; the NSA would then sift through these records
for links to terrorists.10
The litigation that these NSA programs spawned suggests that the
increscent conflict between electronic privacy rights, law enforcement
activities, and our outdated electronic privacy laws has reached nearly
pandemic levels. Multiple cases have been filed throughout the U.S. in
response to the NSA surveillance programs. The plaintiffs in these cases
are not accused terrorists or bad guys, they are ordinary telephone
customers. The defendants are not just the NSA and the government
entities that authorized these surveillance programs; they include almost
every major telecommunications carrier in the U.S. Moreover, although
the U.S. Department of Justice recently decided to subject these NSA
a necessary tool to combat terrorism.” Id. Further, the poll indicates that 57% of Americans
believe that the White House went too far in expanding presidential power in light of the
data mining revelation. Id.
8
See, e.g., Federal Court Strikes Down NSA Warrantless Surveillance Program, ACLU,
http://www.aclu.org/safefree/nsaspying/26489prs20060817.html (last visited Mar. 25,
2007) (noting that the warrantless surveillance program was in direct violation of FISA,
which requires the executive branch to obtain a warrant before engaging in electronic
surveillance of Americans).
9
See, e.g., James Reisen & Eric Lichtblau, Spying Program Snared U.S. Calls, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 21, 2005, at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/21/politics/21nsa.html?ex=
1292821200& en=91d434311b0a7ddc&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss (reporting that the
president authorized the NSA to intercept communications where at least one end of the
communication was outside of the United States.).
10
See, e.g., Leslie Cauley, NSA has massive database of Americans’ phone calls, USA TODAY,
May 10, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-05-10-nsa_x.htm
(reporting that the NSA used data provided by AT&T, Verizon, and BellSouth to analyze
calling patterns).
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surveillance programs to prior judicial review, the facts disclosed in
these proceedings cast a disturbing light on the vast scope of electronic
surveillance in the United States today and the relative ease with which
it can be accomplished.
In some respects, public outrage over the NSA’s surveillance
activities,11 particularly the lack of judicial oversight, misses a larger
point that is the crux of this Article. New communications technologies
raise new privacy concerns, concerns that are not well protected under
the current statutory framework. A threat to privacy rights arises not
only from an executive office or Department of Justice unchecked by
judicial review, but also from the proliferation of new communications
technologies that present the government, or private entities, with
virtually unlimited opportunities to monitor communications and
individual movements with or without judicial supervision. The federal
framework of laws intended to prevent electronic technology from
invading legitimate privacy interests is now rickety and unequal to the
task.
To see how we arrived at this critical juncture, this Article examines
the history and development of electronic privacy laws in the U.S. Then,
this Article reviews recent case law to demonstrate how courts have
struggled to apply electronic privacy laws to rapidly evolving electronic
technology, comments on the need for congressional action, and offers
suggestions for managing electronic information within the current state
of the law.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF ELECTRONIC PRIVACY LAW
A. Common Law, the Constitution, and the Communications Act of 1934
A discussion of state electronic privacy laws and rights is well
beyond the scope of this Article; nevertheless, it is useful to note that
federal electronic privacy laws, and the courts’ interpretations of them,
have evolved from common law concepts of “invasion of privacy” and
“intrusion upon seclusion.”12 For example, the common law concept of

Jefferson, supra note 7.
See generally Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001); Heutche v. United States, 414
U.S. 898 (1973); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S.
323 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
11
12
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what constitutes a “reasonable expectation of privacy” is central to many
court interpretations of electronic privacy rights.13
Although the Fourth Amendment protects persons from
governmental searches and seizures, there is no express constitutional
right of privacy.14 Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court initially refused to
extend the Fourth Amendment’s protections to private telephone
communications.15 It was not until Katz v. United States that the Court
reversed prior decisions and recognized that individuals have legitimate
privacy interests in telephone and electronic communications.
According to Katz, “what [an individual] seeks to preserve as private,
even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected.”16 Nevertheless, because the Fourth Amendment operates
primarily to protect citizens from government or state action, electronic
privacy rights in most instances are governed by federal statutes,
common law “invasion of privacy” claims, and, state privacy laws in
those states that have adopted electronic privacy laws or constitutional
privacy provisions.17
While it took the Court several decades to recognize legitimate
privacy interests in electronic communications, Congress recognized the
need to protect against interception of communications as early as 1912.18

13
47 U.S.C. § 705 (2000); see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (discussing
thermal imaging in relation to reasonable expectation of privacy); United States v. Dunn,
480 U.S. 294 (1987) (discussing the use of electronic monitoring devices in tracking drug
suspects); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (discussing monitoring of telephone
booth use).
14
Katz, 389 U.S. at 350.
15
See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478-79 (1928).
16
Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
17
See, e.g., Sarah DiLuzio, Comment, Workplace E-Mail: It’s Not as Private as You Might
Think, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 741 (2000); Kevin B. Kopp, Comment, Electronic Communications in
the Workplace: E-Mail Monitoring and the Right of Privacy, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 861
(1998).
18
What is known is that section 605 of the Federal Communications Act
of 1934, prohibiting interception and disclosure of non-broadcast radio
transmissions, was incorporated almost verbatim from section 27 of
the Radio Act of 1927 [and] the prohibition on interception and
disclosure contained in the Radio Act of 1927 [was] derived from
section 4 of the Radio Act of 1912. . . . All three of these acts—1912,
1927, and 1934—prohibited disclosure of messages, not only by
amateurs and others who might intercept radio transmissions, but also
by employees of communications companies who, of necessity, have
access to radio messages in the normal course of their jobs.
Kent R. Middleton, Radio Privacy under Section 705(A): An Unconstitutional Oxymoron, 9
ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 583, 588-90 (1995).
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It was then that Congress granted the Interstate Commerce Commission
(“ICC”) authority to prohibit unauthorized persons from intercepting
and divulging the contents of radio communications.19
The
Communications Act of 1934 transferred the ICC’s authority over
communications to the Federal Communications Commission, including
the power to prohibit unauthorized persons from intercepting
communications.20
Over time, state and local law enforcement officials began to pay
deference to federal electronic privacy statutes, even when it arguably
was not required. In part, this was because of the Supremacy Clause and
the larger body of law that had evolved over the years under federal
electronic privacy statutes.21 More recently, the USA PATRIOT Act
empowered state and local prosecutors to use the federal laws in state
court. As a practical matter, the desire to avoid liability under federal
electronic privacy statutes motivates continued deference toward them.22
B. The Wiretap Act of 1968
The current federal framework for electronic surveillance and
individual privacy is composed of several different statutes that
separately govern the surveillance of domestic subjects and matters
involving foreign intelligence. In the wake of the Katz decision,
Congress enacted Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968 (“Wiretap Act of 1968”).23 The Wiretap Act of 1968 set the
blueprint for all subsequent privacy and surveillance laws by generally
protecting the privacy of wire and oral communications while also
permitting certain authorized interceptions. For example, the Wiretap
Act of 1968 authorized interceptions by law enforcement officers acting
pursuant to a court order.24
At the same time, the Wiretap Act of 1968 set unfortunate precedent
for later electronic privacy laws by narrowly limiting the applicability of
19
Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 11621172 (1927) (as codified at 47 U.S.C. § 81
(2000)).
20
Communications Act, ch. 5, 90 Pub. L. 351, 48 Stat. 1103 (1968) (as codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 605 (2000)).
21
AM. PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INST., THE ECPA, ISPS AND OBTAINING E-MAIL: A PRIMER
FOR LOCAL PROSECUTORS (July 2005), available at http://www.ndaa-apri.org/pdf/ecpa_
isps_obtaining_email_05.pdf.
22
Id. at 7.
23
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III, 82
Stat. 197, 211 (1968).
24
18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2000).
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the law to “wire” and “oral” communications, and, by failing to take into
account available or looming technologies such as cordless telephones,
cellular telephones, and other communication services. By this measure,
the Wiretap Act of 1968 failed to heed Justice Brandeis’s prophetic
warning in Olmstead v. United States that “individual protection against
specific abuses of power must have a . . . capacity of adaptation to a
changing world,” especially considering that “subtler and more farreaching means of invading privacy have become available to the
Government.”25
C. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
By 1986, Congress recognized the need to upgrade the 1968 Wiretap
Act and passed the ECPA to account for new computer and
telecommunication technologies.26 The ECPA, which continues to form
the backbone of the current federal laws, extended wiretapping
protections to cellular telephones, private networks, and intra-company
communications while in transit or in storage. Although it was designed
to address anticipated changes in the communications industry, the
drafters of the ECPA evidently did not contemplate the rise of the
Internet as a major communications device or the range of new
communications technologies that would rapidly develop in the ensuing
decade.27
Under current federal law, the interception of the contents of wire,
oral, and electronic communications is regulated by the Wiretap Act of
1968, as amended by the ECPA (collectively “the Wiretap Act”).28 The
Wiretap Act defines “interception” as “the aural or other acquisition of
the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the
use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device.”29 “Electronic
communication” means “any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images,
sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472-73 (1928).
Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848, 1860 (1986).
27
See Jonathan D. Barker, Note, Society’s Carnivores, Both Good and Bad. The Internet
Wiretap: Why We Need it, and How it Should be Regulated, 74 UMKC L. REV. 945, 948 (2006)
(noting that although Congress did design the ECPA to distinguish between different
stages of communication, the legislation nevertheless was designed for an “industry that
was only in its infancy”).
28
18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2000).
29
Id. § 2510(4).
25
26
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part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical
system.”30
Generally, the Wiretap Act makes it unlawful to intentionally
intercept any wire, oral, or electronic communication, or to intentionally
disclose the contents of any such communication when there is reason to
know that the information was obtained through unlawful
interception.31 Violators are subject to fines and imprisonment of not
more than five years.32 Moreover, any person whose wire, oral, or
electronic communication is intercepted or disclosed in violation of the
Wiretap Act may bring a civil action to recover from the person or entity
that engaged in that violation.33
The statute defines an “electronic communications system” as any
“wire, radio, electromagnetic, photo optical or photo electronic facilities
for the transmission of wire or electronic communications, and any
computer facilities or related electronic equipment for the electronic
storage of such communications.”34 “Electronic storage” means any
“temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication
incidental to the electronic transmission thereof, or any storage of such
communication by an electronic communications service for purposes of
backup protection.”35
The Wiretap Act permits the interception of communications using a
pen register or a trap and trace device. Under the statute, the installation
or use of a pen register or trap and trace device without first obtaining a
court order is prohibited, unless the device is used by a provider of wire
or electronic communication service (a) for the operation, maintenance,
and testing of the service or the protection of the rights or property of the
service provider; (b) to record the fact that the communication was
initiated or completed in order to protect the service provider or another
provider furnishing service toward the completion of the
communications; or (c) where the consent of the user of that service has
been obtained.36 Pen registers are devices or processes used to record or
decode dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information of
outbound wire or electronic communications. Similarly, trap and trace
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
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devices or processes capture the electronic or other impulses that
identify the originating number or other dialing, routing, addressing,
and signaling information identifying the source of an incoming
communication.
There are several exemptions to the Wiretap Act’s prohibitions. For
example, the “service provider exemption” states that it is not unlawful
for an operator of a switchboard, or an officer, employee or agent of a
provider of wire or electronic communications service whose facilities
are used in the transmission of a wire or electronic communication, to
intercept, disclose, or use that communication in the normal course of his
employment while engaged in any activity that is necessarily incident to
the rendition of his service or the protection of the rights or property of
the provider of that service.37 There are also several exemptions that
cover the interception of communications for law enforcement purposes,
including § 2511(2)(a)(ii), which authorizes providers of wire or
electronic communications services, landlords, custodians, and other
persons to provide information, facilities, or technical assistance to law
enforcement to intercept communications or conduct electronic
surveillance pursuant to a court order or other written mandate from a
government official, such as the U.S. Attorney General.
The “consent” exemption makes it lawful for a person “not acting
under color of law” to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication
where such person is a party to the communication or where one of the
parties to the communication has given prior consent to the
interception.38 A number of states maintain more restrictive laws that
require consent from all parties to a communication before interception
is lawful.39 In addition, the statute permits persons to intercept or access
electronic communications made through an electronic communication
system that is configured so that the electronic communications are
“readily accessible to the general public.”40
The “general public exemption” assumes that there are some forms
of communication that have no “reasonable expectation of privacy.”41
Id. § 2511(2)(a)(i). Except that a provider of wire communication service to the public
may not utilize service observing or random monitoring except for mechanical or service
quality control checks. Id.
38
Id. § 2511(2)(c).
39
See e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 631(a); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-33.5-5-5 (requiring all party
consent for intentionally interception of a communication)
40
18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i).
41
A similar exemption for stored data that is available to the general public applies
under the SCA, described below. In terms of communications open to the pubic, the
37
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The legislative history of the Wiretap Act reflects congressional intent to
make unlawful only the interception of communications that would
reasonably be deemed “private.”42 This statutory exception creates
problems for many modern forms of communications over “open” or
shared networks, such as the Internet, that might not have been
anticipated when the statute was drafted. Absent proof that electronic
communications using shared networks or Internet-protocols would not
be readily available to the general public, it may be left to the courts to
determine whether these electronic communications are protected under
the Wiretap Act.
D. The Stored Communications Act
Enacted as Title II to the ECPA, the SCA43 makes it unlawful for a
provider of an electronic communications service to knowingly divulge
the contents of a communication while in electronic storage.44 It also
prohibits a person or entity providing remote computing services from
knowingly divulging the contents of any communication which is
carried or maintained on that service.45 A “remote computing service”
means the provision to the public of computer storage or processing
services by means of an electronic communication system.46
However, there are several exemptions for disclosure of stored
communications, including several exemptions that allow a service
provider to divulge the contents of a communication. A service provider
may divulge electronic communications with the lawful consent of the
originator or an addressee or intended recipient of the communication.47
Determining which persons or parties are the “addressee” or “intended
recipient” can be difficult, as shown in the cases that have addressed the

Wiretap Act also states that it is not unlawful to intercept radio communications that are
transmitted by any broadcasting station for use by the general public or for a provider of
electronic communication service to record the fact that a wire or electronic communication
was initiated or completed in order to protect such provider, another provider furnishing
service toward the completion of the wire or electronic communication, or a user of that
service, from fraudulent, unlawful or abusive use of such service. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(g).
42
For a detailed history of the Wiretap Act and congressional intent, see United States v.
Councilman, 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005), which is discussed infra text accompanying notes
107-20.
43
Pub. L. 99-508, tit. II, 100 Stat. 1860, 201[1] (codified in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712).
44
18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1).
45
Id. § 2702(b)(2).
46
Id. § 2711(2).
47
Id. § 2702(b)(1).
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issue, particularly with respect to personal emails sent to or from
employees.48
Other exemptions: a service provider may disclose a stored
electronic communication to an employee, to a person who is authorized
to view the communication, to a person whose facilities are used to
forward the communications to its destination, or to any person as may
be necessarily incident to the rendition of the service or to the protection
of the rights or property of the service provider.49 A service provider
may disclose a stored electronic communication in the normal course of
business while engaged in any activity which is necessarily incident to
the rendition of service or to protect the rights or property of the
provider.50
Additionally, a service provider must disclose electronic
communications to a governmental entity pursuant to a warrant for
communications stored for six months; for communications stored
longer than six months, the service provider must disclose the
communications to a governmental entity with a warrant or if the
government entity provides prior notice to the subscriber and either (1)
uses an administrative subpoena authorized by a federal or state statute
or a federal or state grand jury; or (2) obtains a court order for the
disclosure.51 The service provider must disclose such information to a
law enforcement agency if the contents were inadvertently obtained by
the service provider and appear to pertain to the commission of a crime,
pursuant to provisions of the Crime Control Act, or if the provider
reasonably believes that an emergency involving danger of death or
serious injury to any person requires disclosure of the information with
delay.52
E. The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act
In 1994, Congress passed CALEA to aid law enforcement in its effort
to conduct surveillance of citizens via digital telephone networks.53 The
48
See generally Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); Bartnicki v. United States, 532 U.S.
514 (2001).
49
18 U.S.C. § 2702(b).
50
Id. § 2702(b)(5) (except that the provider cannot use random monitoring except for
mechanical or quality control checks).
51
Id. § 2703.
52
Id.
53
Pub. L. 103-414, tit. I, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994). The purpose, in part, is “to make clear a
telecommunications carrier’s duty to cooperate in the interception of communications for
law enforcement purposes.” Id.
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Act obliges telephone companies to enable law enforcement agencies to
tap any phone conversations carried out over their networks and to
make available call detail records.54 CALEA also stipulates that it must
not be possible for a person to detect that a conversation is being
monitored.55
Additionally, CALEA requires telecommunication carriers to ensure
that all of their equipment, facilities, and services are capable of allowing
government
agents
to
intercept
customer
or
subscriber
communications.56 Specifically, CALEA requires carriers to maintain
equipment that: (1) permits the government, pursuant to court order, to
intercept all wire or electronic communications carried by the carrier; (2)
permits the government to access call-identifying information; (3)
delivers the intercepting communications or call-identifying information
to the government; and (4) facilitates such interceptions and access to
call-identifying information unobtrusively and with a minimum of
interference.57 CALEA does not apply to information services, that is,
services that generate, store, or process information including electronic
publishing and electronic messaging services.58 Telecommunications
carriers that fail to honor the statute’s requirements face civil fines of up
to $10,000 a day.59
F. Customer Proprietary Network Information
Customer proprietary network information (“CPNI”) is the data
collected by telecommunications carriers about a customer’s telephone
calls.60 “It includes the time, date, duration and destination number of
47 U.S.C. § 1002 (2000).
Id. § 1002(a)(4).
56
Id. § 1002(a).
57
Id. § 1002(a). “The term ‘call-identifying information’ means dialing or signaling
information that identifies the origin, direction, destination, or termination of each
communication generated or received by a subscriber by means of any equipment, facility,
or service of a telecommunications carrier.” Id. § 1001(2).
58
Id. § 1002(b).
59
18 U.S.C. § 2522(c) (2000).
60
47 U.S.C. § 222(h)(1).
The term ‘customer proprietary network information’ means (A)
information that relates to the quantity, technical configuration, type,
destination, location, and amount of use of a telecommunications
service subscribed to by any customer of a telecommunications carrier,
and that is made available to the carrier by the customer solely by
virtue of the carrier-customer relationship; and (B) information
contained in the bills pertaining to telephone exchange service or
telephone toll service received by a customer or carrier.
Id.
54
55
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each call, the type of network a consumer subscribes to, and any other
information that appears on the consumer’s telephone bill.”61 For a long
time, telecommunications companies were able to sell this data to third
party companies for marketing purposes.62
Faced with growing
complaints about unwanted telephone solicitations and other marketing
activities, in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress adopted
amendments to the Communications Act to require telecommunications
companies to obtain customers’ approval prior to sharing their CPNI
with third parties.63
Section 222 of the Communications Act, which contains the CPNI
provisions, requires telecommunications carriers “to protect the
confidentiality of proprietary information of, and relating to, other
telecommunication carriers, equipment manufacturers, and customers,
including telecommunication carriers reselling telecommunications
services provided by a telecommunications carrier.”64 The original
impetus for § 222 was consumer protection; it was intended to cut down
on unwanted marketing and advertising solicitations of telephone
customers.65 Nevertheless, the NSA surveillance programs have thrust
§ 222 of the Communications Act squarely into the electronic privacy
debate, as it appears that some of the surveillance activities involved the
culling and screening of CPNI data.
G. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and the USA PATRIOT Act
In 1978, Congress enacted FISA and authorized the government to
conduct electronic surveillance of foreign agents within the United
States.66 FISA also created an exclusive court of review which has
jurisdiction over applications for electronic surveillance of foreign agents
within the United States.67 The court has jurisdiction to review the

61
Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), CPNI, http://www.epic.org/privacy/
cpni/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2007).
62
Id. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 required customers to “opt-in” before their
CPNI was sold to marketing companies; however, there was debate over whether “optout” was a permissible option instead of the “opting-in” interpretation of the Act. Id.
63
47 U.S.C. § 222.
64
Id. § 222(a).
65
S. 652, 104th Cong. (1996). The purpose of the bill was “[t]o promote competition and
reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher quality services for American
telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new
telecommunications technologies.” Id.
66
50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (2000).
67
Id. § 1803(a).
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denial of any application
surveillance.68

electronic

for authority

to

conduct

In 2001, in response to the September 11 terrorist attacks, Congress
passed the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, which amended FISA to account
for new technologies and increased threats.69 In particular, the USA
PATRIOT Act expanded the pen register and trap and trace laws to
include Internet communications and software programs in addition to
telephone communications.70 The USA PATRIOT Act permits the
government to use pen registers to capture a vast amount of information,
including telephone numbers, comprehensive “dialing, routing,
addressing, or signaling information,” and potential Internet-related
information such as email and IP addresses.71 In addition, the USA
PATRIOT Act permits the government, without court approval, to share
the contents of intercepted electronic communications among federal law
enforcement and intelligence personnel.72 In essence, the Act has
enlarged the scope of surveillance statutes, expanded the coverage of
those statutes to include new targets, lowered the government’s
threshold to engage in surveillance, and placed additional
responsibilities on communications providers.73
As examined in this Article, one view of the NSA surveillance
program is that it involved the crashing together of all of these statutes in
a very public and unfortunate way. As best as can be told from the
public record, the NSA program was not limited to “foreign agents”;
instead, it culled electronic communications and records of thousands of
telephone customers who were never considered threats to our national
interests. We now know that the FISA procedures, which were intended
to be a check on this type of government surveillance, were never
68
Id. § 1803(b). The FISA Court of Review is composed of three judges from the U.S.
District Courts or Circuit Courts, appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Id.
69
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, 107 Pub. L. No. 56, 115
Stat. 212 (2001). The majority of the provisions of the PATRIOT Act that were due to end
were renewed in March 2006. See USA PATRIOT Act Improvement Reauthorization Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-77, 120 Stat. 192 (2006) (codified as amended in scattered sections and
titles of the United States Code).
70
See, e.g., United States v. Focarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033, 1039-40 (D. Md. 1972);
Administration’s Draft Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 107th Cong. 50 (2001).
71
Administration’s Draft Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 107th Cong. 50 (2001).
72
18 U.S.C. § 2517 (2000).
73
Jaime S. Gorelick, John H. Harwood & Heather Zachary, Navigating Communications
Regulation in the Wake of 9/11, 57 FED. COMM. L.J. 351, 354 (2005).
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invoked.74 Despite all of Congress’s efforts over the decades to balance
law enforcement needs with reasonable expectations of privacy, from
the plaintiffs’ point of view, the NSA surveillance programs ran
roughshod over the privacy rights of thousands of U.S. citizens.
III. NEW TECHNOLOGIES CHALLENGE THE EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORK
It is the central premise of this Article that the federal framework of
electronic privacy laws is sorely in need of an overhaul in light of today’s
ubiquitous communications technologies. A random sampling of cases
involving alleged violations of the ECPA and other electronic privacy
laws reveals a crazy-quilt of fact-specific outcomes. There is no unitary
theme to these case precedents; they offer little practical guidance to
those who engage in electronic communications and to those who are
entrusted to protect electronic communications and records.
A. Electronic Messaging Services
A recurring theme in ECPA jurisprudence is the difficulty of courts
in determining whether electronic communications are “in transit” and
thus subject to the more strenuous provisions of the Wiretap Act, or,
“stored communications” subject to the less burdensome SCA
provisions. Given the widespread and expanding use of various forms
of online communications, this is a statutory interpretation problem that
is unlikely to go away absent revisions to federal law.
In Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., Inc., a California federal
district court engaged in one of the most comprehensive discussions of
“the legal boundaries of . . . privacy in this interconnected, electroniccommunication age, one in which thoughts and ideas that would have
been spoken personally and privately in ages past are now instantly textmessaged to friends and family via hand-held, computer assisted
electronic devises[.]”75
The Quon case arose from an internal
investigation by the Ontario Police Department into the allegedly
personal and illegal use of department-issued pagers by several
employees.76 The department had previously entered into a contract
with Arch Wireless Operating Company, Inc. to provide its employees
See Dan Eggen, Records on Spy Program Turned Over to Lawmakers, Wash. Post, Feb 1,
2007, at A02, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/
01/31/AR2007013100921_pf.html (noting the administration’s decision, in light of
congressional and public pressure, to replace the controversial NSA warrantless
surveillance program with a program subject to the FISA secret court).
75
445 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1121 (C.D. Cal 2006).
76
Id. at 1121-22.
74
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with pagers and other wireless communication devices.77
The
department required that all of its employees review and sign the
department’s equipment use policy which applied to “the use of any
city-owned computer equipment, computer peripherals, city networks,
the Internet, e-mail services or other city computer related services.”78
The policy further stated that the department recorded and reviewed
access to all Internet sites and that the department reserved the “right to
monitor and log all network activity including e-mail and Internet use,
with or without notice. Users should have no expectation of privacy or
confidentiality when using these resources.”79
At various times, the department informed Quon, one of the
plaintiffs in the case, that the department’s pagers were considered to be
e-mail messages that fell within the department’s policy and were
therefore subject to audit.80 The department, however, “had an unstated
policy of agreeing not to audit the use of the pagers whenever overages
existed so long as the personnel in question paid the department for the
overage.”81 In any case, the department did not have the ability to
review pager messages without first contacting Arch Wireless and
requesting that they generate a transcript of the messages.82 Eventually,
the department decided to change its informal policy and audited the
pager transcripts to determine to what extent the overages were caused
by personal use and contacted Arch Wireless for copies of the pagers’
transcripts.83 Prior to providing the department with the transcripts,
Arch Wireless “confirmed that the pagers were owned by the city and
that the request came from the designated contact person. After
satisfying itself of these two points, Arch Wireless provided transcripts
of the contents of the messages sent and received by the pagers during
the time in question.”84
Upon reviewing the transcripts, the department determined that
Quon had been using his pager for personal reasons, including the
transmission of sexually explicit messages to his wife and girlfriend.85
The transcripts were turned over to Internal Affairs who took action

77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
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against the plaintiffs.86 The collective plaintiffs, in turn, filed suit against
the department and Arch Wireless, asserting violation of the SCA.87
In defense, Arch Wireless argued that 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(3) permits
a carrier to disclose the contents of a stored electronic communication
when done “‘with the lawful consent of the originator or an addressee or
intended recipient of such communication [in the case of an electronic
communication service], or the subscriber in the case of remote
computing service.’”88 The key issue focused on whether “the service
provided by Arch Wireless—that is, of being able to retrieve for its
subscribers text messages that have been sent over its communication
network and are held in long-term storage on its computers—constitutes
a remote computing service, or, rather, is more properly characterized as
an electronic communication service.”89 According to the court, the
classification of Arch Wireless’s service would determine whether Arch
Wireless was exempt under the statute.90
Arch Wireless argued that because it stored the messages on a
computer, the service was akin to e-mail and therefore a remote
computing service. But the court noted that unlike email, which permits
the original sender to access the message even when stored, the textmessages could not be retrieved without Arch Wireless’s assistance.91 As
such, the court addressed whether such a “direct-accessibility feature”
was a necessary component of a remote computing service.92 Although
the plaintiffs argued that interconnectivity was a key element of a remote
computing service, the court found that the statute’s language did not
specifically require or even address interconnectivity.93 According to the
court, “[u]nder the SCA, the centrality a computer plays in facilitating
the communication is key to Congress’ definition of a remote computing
service.”94 The court found this definition no longer particularly relevant
considering the ubiquity of computers as forms of electronic
communication.95 For example, the transmission of text messages
Id.
Id. at 1128. Quon also asserted violations of the Fourth Amendment and state law
claims for violations of the California Constitution, California Penal Code, invasion of
privacy, and defamation. Id.
88
Id. at 1130 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(3)).
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 1131.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 1132.
95
Id. at 1133.
86
87
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probably satisfied the definition of an electronic communication whereas
the long-term storage of such messages might qualify as a remote
computing service.96 Acknowledging that Arch Wireless’s services
incorporated elements of both types of services, the court held that given
that the retrieval of messages in long-term storage was at issue,
§ 2702(b)(3)’s subscriber exception applied.97
Next, the court addressed whether the department had violated
Quon’s reasonable expectation of privacy by reviewing his messages.98
According to the court, the department failed to provide Quon with fair
notice that the pager communications were open to public view because
of its contradictory official and informal policies.99 The court found that
the department’s informal policy of not reviewing the contents of
messages so long as the user paid the overage charges undercut the
formal policy provision allowing the department to review and monitor
all pager messages.100 Specifically, the court noted that
it is unreasonable to expect that an employee would
assume that some other unstated norm should inform
their opinion on how much privacy to expect in using an
employer’s equipment once that employer expressly
informs his or her employees of an actual policy
regarding the use of that very equipment.101
Since Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the messages the
department’s audit was not justified.102 The outcome of the claim
depended largely on whether the department read the transcripts in
order to discover misconduct or to improve efficiency.103 As such, the
court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment so that a
jury could determine the purpose of the audit.104

96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
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B. Internet-Based Communications
Email has largely supplanted the telephone as the main form of
communications in the business world.105 From the law enforcement
perspective, an agent can examine email by “acquiring a Title I content
warrant, a Title II store communications order, a Title III pen register
order, or a FISA warrant . . . .”106 Perhaps paradoxically, given the
ubiquitous nature of email and the use of Internet-based message
services, the courts continue to grapple with statutory definitions for
these technologies. Defining these technologies is a critical predicate to
determining the extent to which they are entitled to privacy protection
under federal law.
The recent case of United States v. Councilman underscores the
difficulty of squeezing twenty-first-century technology into twentiethcentury laws.107 In Councilman, defendant Bradford C. Councilman was
the vice-president of “an online rare and out-of-print book listing
service” called Interloc.108 In addition to the book listing service, Interloc
provided customers with email accounts and acted as a service provider
for these accounts.109 To better target customers and respond to growing
competition from Amazon.com, Interloc intercepted and copied email
communications sent from Amazon.com to its customers before
delivering the messages into customer email accounts.110
The
government charged Councilman with Wiretap Act violations due to his
intercepting emails.111
In defense, Councilman argued that the
intercepted e-mails were in electronic storage at the time and therefore
not subject to the Wiretap Act’s prohibition against intercepting
electronic communications.112
The district court dismissed the
indictment, a divided panel of the First Circuit affirmed; an en banc
panel reversed and remanded.113

Ferris Research, http://www.ferris.com/research-library/industry-statistics/ (last
visited Mar. 25, 2007). Industry statistics show that in 2006, business email users sent over
6 trillion non-spam e-mail messages. Id. Every day, approximately 25 billion non-spam email messages are sent. Id.
106
Holland, supra note 6, at 407.
107
418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005).
108
Id. at 70.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id. at 70-71.
112
Id. at 71.
113
Id. at 69, 85.
105

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 4 [2007], Art. 3

1500 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

On rehearing, the First Circuit disagreed with Councilman’s
assertion and found that the e-mail messages were electronic
communications.114 The crux of the analysis focused on the definition of
electronic communication and whether communications that went into
momentary electronic storage qualified as electronic communications.115
Accordingly, the court began its analysis by reviewing the language of
the Wiretap Act, concluding that the “ECPA’s plain text does not clearly
state whether a communication is still an ‘electronic communication’
within the scope of the Wiretap Act when it is in electronic storage
during transmission. Applying canons of construction does not resolve
the question. Given this continuing ambiguity, we turn to the legislative
history.”116 Based on the Act’s legislative history, the court found that
there was no evidence that Congress intended to exclude the temporary
storage of an electronic communication during transmission from the
scope of the Wiretap Act.117 As a result, the court concluded that the
term “electronic communication” as used in the Wiretap Act included
the temporary storage of electronic communications.118
The First Circuit reached its ultimate decision based primarily on its
interpretation of the Wiretap Act’s legislative history, rather than on an
analysis of the statute itself. Given the election to steer around the plain
language of the statute, it is perhaps not surprising that other courts
have reached different conclusions with respect to their treatment of
email under the Wiretap Act.119 Similarly, several courts interpreting
state statutes similar to ECPA have found that email is a recorded
medium in which the communication is sent to other computers and is
therefore subject to interception since the sender would not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy.120

Id. at 79.
Id. at 72-79.
116
Id. at 76.
117
Id. at 76-79.
118
Id. at 79.
119
See Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Service, 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994)
(holding that the interception of a private electronic email which was stored on a bulletin
board did not fall within the scope of the Wiretap Act); see also Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines,
302 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir. 2002) (endorsing the Steve Jackson view that communications
cannot be intercepted while in electronic storage).
120
See Commonwealth v. Proetto, 771 A.2d 823 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) (standing for the
proposition that the sender has no privacy interest in the email communication because the
recipient’s computer would record the email); Holland, supra note 6, at 409-10 (discussing
State v. Townsend, 57 P.3d 255 (Wash. 2002)).
114
115
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Courts have also struggled to determine where web sites and
Internet “bulletin boards” fit within the Wiretap Act’s statutory
framework. In Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, an airline employer had used
access codes given by Konop, an employee, to other individuals to access
Konop’s website, where unfavorable comments about the employer had
been posted.121
Konop claimed that the airline had unlawfully
intercepted private electronic communications in violation of the
Wiretap Act.122
The Konop court considered whether the airline had violated an
employee’s privacy rights by accessing his private website.123 The court
noted that the intersection of the ECPA and SCA was a “convoluted[ ]
area of the law” and that “[c]ourts have struggled to analyze problems
involving modern technology within the confines of this statutory
framework . . . .”124 After reviewing the legislative history, the court
concluded that Congress’s intent in enacting the ECPA was to protect
private electronic communications.125 Nevertheless, the Internet makes it
almost impossible to determine the identity of web visitors or to
determine whether a visitor was actually eligible to view a given
website.126 The Ninth Circuit held that the website qualified as an
electronic communication under the Wiretap Act, but that websites can
only be intercepted under the Wiretap Act during active transmission
and not while a message is in electronic storage.127 Consequently, the
Konop court found that the airline had not violated the Wiretap Act.
Next, the Konop court considered whether the airline had violated
the SCA by accessing the employee’s website without proper
authorization.128 The SCA exempts from its requirements persons who
are users of the service or who are the intended recipients of the
communication.129 Finding that the airline was not an authorized user of
the website, the court dismissed the airline’s motion for summary
judgment.130 The Konop court recognized that “until Congress brings the
laws in line with modern technology, protection of the Internet and

121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130

302 F.3d at 872.
Id. at 873.
Id. at 874.
Id.
Id. at 875.
Id.
Id. at 875-76, 878.
Id. at 879.
Id. at 880.
Id.
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websites such as Konop’s will remain a confusing and uncertain area of
the law.”131
The courts and government have strained to fit other Internet-based
communications technologies, such as VOIP and instant messaging, into
the existing federal privacy law framework.132 VOIP technology allows
users to place what appear to be traditional telephone calls, but instead
the voice data is transferred via Internet protocol (where multiple
packets of unrelated voice data are essentially “streamed” together over
broadband connections, and then reassembled on the receiver’s end of
the communication) rather than dedicated telephone circuits.133 Internetbased communication technologies strain the existing legal system
because courts have often refused to “recognize a ‘reasonable
expectation of privacy’ in Internet electronic communications reasoning
that, as the Internet is public in nature, communications therein should
receive a disfavored privacy protection status.”134
Although VOIP services are not considered “telecommunications
common carrier” services, such as conventional telephone service, the
FCC recently concluded, after considerable coaxing from the FBI, that
CALEA applies to facilities-based broadband Internet access services and
interconnected VOIP.135 According to the Commission, Congress
intended the term “telecommunications carrier” in CALEA to apply to a
broader group of entities than in the Communications Act.136 “In today’s
technological environment, where IP-based broadband networks are
rapidly replacing the legacy narrowband circuit-switched network,
various types of packet-mode equipment are increasingly being
deployed to ‘originate, terminate, or direct communications’ to their
intended destinations.”137

Id. at 874.
A report in 2004 by the Pew Institute indicates that over 53 million Americans use
instant messaging and that over 11 million employees use instant messaging at work.
EULYNN SHIU & AMANDA LENHART, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, HOW
AMERICANS USE INSTANT MESSAGING i, ii (2004), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/
pdfs/PIP_Instantmessage_Report.pdf.
133
Barker, supra note 27, at 952-53.
134
Daniel B. Garrie, Matthew J. Armstrong & Donald P. Harris, Voice Over Internet
Protocol and the Wiretap Act: Is Your Conversation Protected, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 97, 122-23
(2005).
135
In the Matter of Communications Assistance for law Enforcement Act and Broadband
Access and Services, First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
FCC 05-153, ¶ 8 (Sept. 23, 2005).
136
Id. ¶ 10.
137
Id. ¶ 11.
131
132
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The Commission concluded that CALEA covers all facilities-based
providers of broadband Internet access including wireline, cable modem,
satellite, wireless, fixed wireless, and broadband via powerline
providers.138 Specifically, the Commission found that that CALEA
created three categories of telecommunication services to cover pure
telecommunications (fully covered by CALEA), pure information (not
covered by CALEA), and hybrid services (partially covered by
CALEA).139 According to the Commission, broadband and VOIP
services fall within the hybrid services tier and are therefore partially
covered by CALEA.140
Privacy groups attacked the Commission’s decision as contrary to
CALEA’s statutory provisions and a threat to individual privacy.141
However, in American Council on Education v. FCC, the D.C. Circuit
denied a petition for review based on a Chevron deference analysis of the
Commission’s Report and Order.142 The plaintiff had challenged the
FCC’s decision on the grounds that the Commission, in proceedings
implementing the Telecommunications Act of 1996, had previously
classified broadband Internet access as information services.143 The court
dismissed the plaintiff’s argument, citing differences between the two
statutes and finding that the Commission’s decision to classify
broadband Internet access under CALEA as a hybrid service was a
“reasonable policy choice” under Chevron.144 In essence, the FCC is
treating VOIP communications as akin to “common carriage” for
purposes of CALEA’s law enforcement mandates; however, it may be up
to the courts to determine whether VOIP communications will be
afforded privacy protection under federal electronic privacy laws.
C. Cellular Telephone Interceptions and Surveillance
Another example of how technology has outgrown the existing legal
framework is the use of “roving bugs” by law enforcement officials. A
“roving bug” occurs when a government agent, “with court approval
and mobile-phone carrier assistance required by law[,] can exploit
mobile phones over the air in such a way that microphones in handsets
are activated and nearby conversations picked up by federal
Id. ¶ 24.
Id. ¶ 16-18.
140
Id. ¶ 24-45.
141
Jay Lyman, FCC Criticized for VoIP Tapping Requirements, TECHNEWSWORLD, Aug. 11,
2005, http://www.technewsworld.com/story/45416.html.
142
451 F.3d 226 (D.C. Cir 2006).
143
Id. at 227-28.
144
Id. at 228-36.
138
139
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investigators.”145 In order to initiate the microphone in a mobile phone
the carrier must first place the phone into a diagnostic mode. Once this
occurs, the microphone can pick up conversations in the area around the
phone without the user knowing that the phone is recording.
Although “roving bugs” have been recognized as legitimate
surveillance tools for several years, a recent New York case demonstrates
how the cellular telephone has expanded the scope, effectiveness, and
invasiveness of such surveillance tools.146 In United States v. Tomero, the
FBI requested and received court authorization to use roving bugs to
record the conversations of several individuals associated with an
organized crime family.147 The FBI used this authorization to record
hundreds of hours of conversations through several cell phones,
regardless of whether the phones were turned on or off.148 The court
rejected all of the defendant’s constitutional and non-constitutional
defenses.149 First, the court rejected the defendant’s claim that the use of
roving bugs was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment because
the warrant did not limit the search to a particular place.150 Second, the
court held that the FBI’s warrant applications satisfied 18 U.S.C. § 2518
because they indicated that alternative methods were unlikely to
succeed, they targeted conversations that included at least one known
subject, and because the government was only required to show “that
the defendants moved often enough that the regular procedures for
obtaining a warrant would inhibit the interception of some conversations
needed for the investigation.”151
In United States v. Forest, two defendants challenged their arrests for
cocaine possession, claiming statutory and constitutional violations
arising from data intercepted from their cellular phones by law
enforcement officials who had previously obtained court authorization

Jeffrey Silva, Roving Bugs: Wiretap Law Can Turn Cell Phone into Microphone, RCR
WIRELESS NEWS, Dec. 16, 2006, at 1.
146
See, e.g., United States v. Bianco, 998 F.2d 1112, 1122-24 (2d Cir. 1993) (upholding the
constitutionality of “roving bugs” for interception of oral communications that are not
transmitted via wire or electronic means); see also United States v. Gaytan, 74 F.3d 545. 553
(5th Cir. 1996) (upholding the constitutionality of “roving bugs” for the interception of oral
communications that are not transmitted via wire or electronic means); United States v.
Petti, 973 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1035 (1993).
147
462 F. Supp. 2d 565 (2006).
148
Id. at 566-57.
149
Id. at 572.
150
Id. at 569.
151
Id. at 572.
145
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to intercept the conversations.152 The authorization also required the
cellular provider to disclose to the government defendants’ subscriber
information, toll records, and other relevant information.153 Based on
information received through the cellular phone interceptions, law
enforcement officials began conducting physical surveillance of the
defendants, but found that they were unable to maintain constant visual
contact.154 “In order to reestablish visual contact, a DEA agent dialed
[defendant’s] cellular phone (without allowing it to ring) several times
that day and used Sprint’s computer data to determine which cellular
transmission towers were being ‘hit’ by [defendant’s] phone. This ‘cellsite data’ revealed the general location of [defendant].”155 The officers
repeated this procedure in order to maintain their physical surveillance
of the defendants.156
On appeal, defendants argued that the government’s use of their cell
phone data turned their phones into tracking devices in violation of the
Wiretap Act and the Fourth Amendment.157 But the Sixth Circuit agreed
with the district court’s finding that the cellular phone data was an
electronic communication rather than a wire or oral communication.158
As a result, the Circuit Court dismissed defendant’s request to suppress
the evidence under the Wiretap Act because the Act only permitted
suppression of wire or oral communications.159
Next, the court
addressed defendant’s claim that the government’s use of his cellular
phone as a tracking device violated 18 U.S.C. § 3117(a), governing the
use of mobile tracking devices, and determined that § 3117 did not
provide for suppression as a remedy to the government’s actions.160 The
court also addressed the defendants’ argument that the government’s
use of their cellular phones as tracking devices violated their Fourth
Amendment rights, but held that defendants did not have a claim
because their data was intercepted only while they traveled on public
355 F.3d 942, 946-47 (6th Cir. 2004).
Id.
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
Id. at 947-48.
157
Id. at 948. Another interesting issue is whether the location information obtained from
the defendant’s cellular phones even qualifies as “call-identifying” data under CALEA. For
a further discussion of this issue, see Who Knows Where You’ve Been? Privacy Concerns
Regarding the Use of Cellular Phones as Personal Locators, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 307, 315
(2004).
158
Forest, 355 F.3d at 948-49. The court acknowledged that there was a strong argument
that “cell-site data is not a form of communication at all.” Id. at 949.
159
Id.
160
Id. at 949-50.
152
153
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highways. 161 Instead, the court noted that the cell-site data was “simply
a proxy for [defendant’s] visually observable location.”162
Tomero and Forest reveal how the government can easily intercept
conversations or track individuals’ movements through cellular phones.
In addition, some cellular phone carriers and private companies have
begun offering products that allow cellular phone users to track the
movements of other cellular phone users. In late 2006, Boost Mobile, a
pre-paid cellular phone service owned by Sprint, introduced a mobiletracking system service that allows users to track the whereabouts of
friends.163 Loopt, the company that created the system, claims to have
“developed safeguards to ensure that mobile-phone users are tracked
only by people they know and only when they want to be found.”164
Other cellular phone carriers have hesitated to implement similar
systems because of privacy and safeguard concerns. Verizon Wireless
for example, has stated “concerns about making sure a tracking service is
done right, . . . The last thing we want to do is let a genie out of a bottle
and find that the service is misused.”165
D. Automobile Communications Surveillance
Over the past few years, automobile manufacturers have begun to
equip their vehicles with telecommunication devices that provide drivers
with on-board services such as navigation, information services,
emergency services, and road-side assistance. These services generally
operate through a combination of cellular and global positioning system
technologies. General Motors has incorporated this technology into at
least 50 of its 2007 models.166 Although these systems provide drivers
with important, and at times life-saving services, they also provide law
enforcement officials with a powerful and tempting “roving bug”
surveillance tool.
As these services have become widespread, it has been left to the
courts to determine whether they are covered under federal wiretap and
surveillance laws. In The Company v. United States, the Ninth Circuit
considered “whether the statute governing private parties’ obligations to
Id.
Id. at 951.
163
Marguerite Reardon, Mobile Phones that Track Your Buddies, Nov. 14, 2006, http://
news.com.com/Mobile+phones+that+track+your+buddies/2100-1039_3-6135209.html.
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
Onstar, 2007 Onstar Equipped Vehicles, http://www.onstar.com/us_english/jsp/
equip_vehicles/07_vehicles.jsp (last visted Mar. 28, 2007).
161
162
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assist the federal government in intercepting communications” required
one such service provider to assist the government in intercepting
conversations through the service.167 In that case, the FBI sought to use
the Company’s auto service as a “roving bug” and obtained several court
orders requiring the Company to help the FBI intercept conversations
through the system.168 The lower court that granted the FBI’s requests
determined that the service provider was a “telecommunications carrier”
and “provider of wire or electronic communication service” under 18
U.S.C. § 2518(4) and § 2522.169 Objecting to the use of its product for
surveillance purposes, the Company expressed concern that “if no
operator is on the line and only the FBI is listening in, there will be no
response to the subscriber’s emergency signaled by the transmitted
tone.”170
On review, the Ninth Circuit considered the key question: “When
may a company, not a common carrier but possessing a unique ability to
facilitate the interception of oral communications, be required to assist
law enforcement in intercepting such communications?”171 Comparing
the facts of the case to the ECPA’s statutory requirements, the court
found that the conversations intercepted through the system qualified as
“oral communications” under § 2510(3) because the occupants of the
vehicle reasonably expected that their conversations were private and
not subject to interception.172 Next, the court addressed whether the
Company had an obligation to assist the FBI in intercepting the
communications.173 In order to answer this question, the court had to
determine whether the Company was a “provider of wire or electronic
communication service, landlord, custodian, or other person” as
required by § 2518(4).174 The Company claimed that it was not a
provider of such a service because it did not operate the cellular service
incorporated into the system.175 After analyzing the statute’s language,
the court determined that the Company qualified as a “provider of wire
or electronic communication service” because the Company billed the
customers directly for the service and because the customers had no

349 F.3d 1132, 1134 (9th Cir. 2003).
Id.; see Susan W. Brenner & Leo L. Clarke, Fourth Amendment Protection for Shared
Privacy Rights in Stored Transactional Data, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 211, 223 n.30 (2006).
169
The Company, 349 F.3d at 1134.
170
Id. at 1135.
171
Id. at 1137.
172
Id. at 1138.
173
Id.
174
Id. at 1139.
175
Id.
167
168
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contact with the cellular telephone company.176 According to the court,
“[t]he service-providing structure here is very much akin to
circumstances in which an established long distance telephone carrier
offers local phone service even though it does not own or operate any of
the local infrastructure.”177 The court concluded that for purposes of
§ 2518(4), the statute does distinguish between “those service providers
that furnish their own facilities, and those service providers like the
Company that do not.”178
The court also held that the Company qualified as an “other person”
under § 2518(4), noting that the term “other person” includes individuals
or entities that provide a service to the targets of electronic surveillance
and who are uniquely able to assist law enforcement officials in
intercepting communications through their facilities or service.179
Specifically, the court found that “The Company [was] uniquely situated
to facilitate the interception of the oral communications within the
vehicle . . . .”180 The court held that the Company qualified as an “other
person” and fell within the purview of § 2518(4)’s requirements.181
Having determined that the Company was required to comply with
the ECPA’s provisions, the court addressed whether the FBI’s requests
went too “far in interfering with the service provided by the Company”
under § 2518, which required that the assistance be provided with a
“minimum of interference with the services” of the provider.182
Although the court recognized that § 2518 permits a certain level of
interference, the court found under the facts of the case that the FBI’s
requests were too obtrusive because they completely shut down the
provider’s service.183 The court concluded that although the Company
fell within the purview of § 2518(4) as both a “provider” and an “other
person,” the district court erred by granting the FBI’s requests because

Id. at 1140.
Id.
179
Id.
179
Id. at 1141-42.
180
Id. at 1143.
181
Id.
182
Id. at 1144.
183
Id. at 1146. See Dorothy L. Glancy, Privacy on the Open Road, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 295,
318 n.90 (2004); Eva Marie Dowdell, Note & Comment, You are Here! Mapping the
Boundaries of the Fourth Amendment with GPS Technology, 32 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J.
109, 116 n.60 (2005).
176
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https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss4/3

Joyce and Bigart: Liability for All, Privacy for None: The Conundrum of Protecting

2007]

Liability for All, Privacy for None

1509

the Company “could not assist the FBI without disabling the System in
the monitored car.”184
A dissenting judge opined that the FBI’s actions were in compliance
with the federal statutes, and was not particularly swayed by the
potential harm that this surveillance program could cause to the
Company’s “emerging business . . . because people might not subscribe
to its service if they become aware of [the] potential for court-ordered
eavesdropping[.]”185 Of course, that was presumably why the service
provider prosecuted this appeal: to avoid having its safety and
convenience product from intentionally becoming a primary tool for law
enforcement activities.
IV. THE NSA SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM AND FEDERAL PRIVACY LAW
In adopting the ECPA, CALEA, and FISA, Congress intended to
strike a balance between individual privacy interests and legitimate law
enforcement needs.
Recent revelations about the NSA’s secret
surveillance programs suggest that these statutes may no longer be
capable of balancing these competing interests. And, as discussed above,
the proliferation of new technologies has given law enforcement new
surveillance tools that further strain the existing legal framework and
place increasing burdens on the judicial system to strike the appropriate
balance.
The foundation for Hepting and other related NSA surveillance cases
was laid by the press.186 On December 16, 2005, The New York Times
reported that President Bush had previously authorized the NSA to
engage in the covert, warrantless wiretapping of U.S. citizens.187 The
story immediately caused a public uproar that forced the government to
defend its action as a key weapon in the fight against terrorism.
In its defense, the government revealed select details about the
program, including that: (1) the program performed wiretaps on
international communications between U.S. citizens and foreign entities;
(2) the program was implemented by non-judicial “career professionals”
at the NSA when they had reasonable grounds to suspect that a party to
a communication was a member of a foreign terrorist organization; (3)
The Company, 349 F.3d at 1146.
Id. at 1149.
186
See infra text accompanying notes 207-15 (discussing Hepting).
187
Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 16, 2005, at A1.
184
185
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the wiretaps targeted U.S. citizens; and (4) the government did not seek
FISA or any other judicial warrants prior to beginning its surveillance.188
Not surprisingly, litigation ensued.
Similarly, in ACLU v. NSA, a group of citizens filed suit against the
NSA challenging the constitutionality of the program under the Fourth
Amendment.189
The plaintiffs consisted of individuals whose
international telephone and internet communications were intercepted
and recorded by the government.190 Engaging in a lengthy review of the
judicial precedent concerning government electronic surveillance, the
federal district court focused the bulk of its analysis on whether the
executive branch had exceeded the scope of its constitutional powers and
taken on a role traditionally reserved for the judiciary and Congress
under the separation of powers. For example, the court noted that in
United States v. United States District Court,191 the Supreme Court
established that the Fourth Amendment requires the government to seek
a warrant prior to engaging in domestic security surveillance.192 The
court went on to cite Justice Powell’s opinion for the proposition that the
executive branch’s duty is to “enforce the laws, to investigate, and to
prosecute . . . . But those charged with this investigative and
prosecutorial duty should not be the sole judges of when to utilize
constitutionally sensitive means in pursuing their tasks.”193
In addition, the court noted that Congress designed FISA to provide
the executive branch with a clear and well-defined framework for
engaging in electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence.194 Further,
the court noted that in enacting FISA, Congress had “made numerous
concessions to stated executive needs.” The problem identified by the
court is that post-911, the government no longer seems satisfied to limit
its operations as required under the current legal framework. It seems
that the executive branch implemented the NSA without regard to FISA
or the Fourth Amendment.195 “The President of the United States, a
creature of the same Constitution which gave us these Amendments, has
undisputedly violated the Fourth in failing to procure judicial orders as
Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr. & Robert B. Shaw, Down to the Wire: Assessing the
Constitutionality of the National Security Agency’s Warrantless Wiretapping Program: Exit the
Rule of Law, 17 J. LAW & PUB. POL’Y 429, 432 (2006).
189
438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 758 (E. D. Mich 2006).
190
Id.
191
407 U.S. 297 (1972).
192
ACLU, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 772.
193
Id. at 775.
194
Id. at 773.
195
Id. at 775.
188
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required by FISA, and accordingly has violated the First Amendment
Rights of these Plaintiffs as well.”196
The government argued that it had not violated the Constitution
because Congress had granted the president the power to use all
necessary and appropriate force to prevent future terrorist attacks in the
Authorization for Use of Military Force (“AUMF”) passed shortly after
9/11.197 The court dismissed this argument because the AUMF does not
address intelligence or surveillance, and, because FISA and the ECPA
clearly state that surveillance may only be conducted pursuant to prior
warrants.198 Additionally, the court also dismissed the government’s
claim that the president’s inherent powers were sufficient to authorize
the NSA program; in the end, the court granted the plaintiff’s request for
a permanent injunction.199
In response, the government filed an appeal with the Sixth Circuit.200
In addition, approximately six months after the ACLU v. NSA opinion,
the government voluntarily changed the NSA surveillance program so
that the FISA court would review each surveillance request.201 Although
many privacy advocates cheered the government’s decision and
characterized the change as a “retreat,” the government continues to
defend the president’s authority to engage in unauthorized
wiretapping.202 At the same time, the government moved the Sixth
Circuit to dismiss the lawsuit since it had subsequently placed the NSA
program under FISA review.203 In its filing, the government stated that
the plaintiffs’ challenge was moot because the challenged surveillance
activity no longer existed.204 However, in a public statement the ACLU
Id. at 776.
Id. at 779.
198
Id.
199
Id. at 780-82.
200
Dan Eggen, Court Will Oversee Wiretap Program, WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 2007, at A01.
201
Id.
202
See id. Eggen noted:
White House and Justice officials said the president was not retreating
from his stance that he has the constitutional and legislative authority
to order warrantless surveillance on international calls but [that] the
new rules promulgated by the surveillance court have satisfied
concerns about whether the FISA process can move quickly enough to
authorize surveillance.
Id. Further, the Justice Department has continued to argue that federal judges are not
qualified to decide terrorism issues. Id.
203
Dan Eggen, Dismissal of Lawsuit Against Warrantless Wiretaps Sought, WASH. POST, Jan.
26, 2007, at A05.
204
Id.
196
197
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stated that “‘[t]he FISA court didn’t reach out on its own to do
something; the government asked it to do something, . . . And absent a
ruling, they are free to return to their illegal conduct again.’”205
The NSA program launched a slew of lawsuits against the
companies that cooperated with the government by providing access to
customer information. Although most of these cases remain in litigation,
they nevertheless demonstrate that companies that cooperate with the
government cannot necessarily rely on the statutory safe harbors for
protection from angry customers. For example, in Hepting and Terkel v.
AT&T, two district courts reached two different conclusions about the
legality of the NSA programs despite many common facts.
In Hepting, plaintiffs filed suit against AT&T for essentially
collaborating with the NSA wiretap program.206 AT&T immediately
moved to dismiss the case alleging that the plaintiffs lacked standing.207
In addition, the government moved to intervene as a defendant and
moved to dismiss the claim based on the state secrets privilege.208
However, according to the Hepting court, the government could not
claim the state secrets privilege because it had disclosed significant
information to the public about the program; as a result, the court
rejected the government’s motion to dismiss.209 In support, the court
noted that “the very subject matter of this action is hardly a
secret . . . public disclosures by the government and AT&T indicate that
AT&T is assisting the government to implement some kind of
surveillance program.”210
For its part, AT&T argued that plaintiffs lacked standing and that
AT&T was entitled to statutory, common law, and qualified immunity.211
More specifically, ATT argued that under 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(ii)(B),
“telecommunications providers are immune from suit if they receive a
government certification authorizing them to conduct electronic
surveillance.”212 The court found that it did not need to address AT&T’s
claim because the plaintiffs pled that AT&T acted outside the scope of
government certification.213 In essence, the Hepting court held that the
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
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issue of whether the government authorized AT&T to disclose customer
records was an issue that warranted further litigation.214
To further confuse matters, in Terkel, another district court
addressing similar claims against AT&T reached virtually opposite
conclusions. In Terkel, the district court addressed a challenge to AT&T’s
disclosure of records of customer communications.215 Plaintiffs alleged
that AT&T had violated 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(3) by releasing records to the
NSA.216 Although the court denied AT&T’s motion to dismiss, the court
did grant the government’s motion to dismiss because “in contrast to the
alleged content monitoring that is a key focus of the Hepting case, there
have been no public disclosures of the existence or non-existence of
AT&T’s claimed record turnover—the sole focus of the current
complaint in the present case—that are sufficient to overcome the
government’s assertion of the state secrets privilege.”217 The court
concluded that § 2702(a)(3) provides private individuals with
enforceable rights against carriers that disclose communication records
to third parties; having found that plaintiffs alleged a sufficient injury
under the statute, the court denied AT&T’s motion to dismiss.218
Nevertheless, the government convinced the court to dismiss the
case based on the state secrets doctrine.219 After engaging in a lengthy
review of the state secrets doctrine precedent, the court concluded that
“based on the government’s public submission, the Court is persuaded
that requiring AT&T to confirm or deny whether it has disclosed large
quantities of telephone records to the federal government could give
adversaries of this county valuable insight into the government’s
intelligence activities.”220 Because the plaintiffs could not establish
standing without such information from AT&T, the court granted the
government’s motion to dismiss.221
V. LESSONS LEARNED AND THE WAY FORWARD
Although the NSA surveillance litigation is ongoing, it is not too
early to draw conclusions from the courts’ initial decisions. Likewise,
court decisions that have attempted to apply federal electronic privacy
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221

Id. at 1003.
441 F. Supp. 2d 899, 900 (N. D. Ill 2006).
Id. at 901.
Id.
Id. at 904.
Id.
Id. at 917.
Id.
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law to cellular phones, Internet-based services, and other new
technologies provide perhaps unintended lessons. The clear implication
from all of these hotly contested cases is that an understanding of
electronic privacy law has become critical whether you are a business, a
government agent, or a private citizen, given the ubiquitous nature of
the communications services we use every day.
From the perspective of an employer, corporation or enterprise, even
those that are not technically “communications service providers,” the
early lessons from the NSA cases are fairly apparent, the main one being:
ask for a court order before participating in any law enforcement
surveillance activity. It may be hard to say “no” to law enforcement
officials, and, public safety is obviously a collective concern. Still, if an
electronic surveillance program is legitimate, it’s difficult to imagine
why the government would be unable to get a court order to enforce it.
Indeed, the Department of Justice’s recent capitulation to FISA oversight
for the NSA surveillance programs begs the question as to why they
didn’t get a court order in the first place.
There may be various exemptions and protections for compliance
with electronic surveillance programs, but, it is unwise for any business
to invite a judicial proceeding to determine whether those exemptions
apply to their particular actions. All businesses, and in particular
communications businesses, should have in place well-defined
procedures and protocols for dealing with law enforcement surveillance
requests.222
With respect to electronic privacy issues in general, and the cases
reviewed herein that have struggled to interpret relevant law, it is
difficult to create simple or comprehensive plans and procedures to
govern all forms of advanced communications technology.
Fundamentally, all businesses and workplaces ought to have clearly
defined internal rules and procedures for handling every form of
electronic communications available throughout their enterprises. These
electronic communications policies need to be in writing, they need to be
explained to all employees, employees need to read them, these policies
need to be routinely honored and enforced, and they need to be revised
whenever new laws, cases, technologies, or situations warrant their
reconsideration.
For example, surveillance statutes now also apply to cable operators who have never
previously faced requests for surveillance cooperation. Gorelick et al, supra note 73, at 361.
Cable operators must develop internal protocols and procedures to comply with such
requests while still meeting their customer’s needs and privacy expectations.
222
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From an individual’s perspective, citizens need to understand that
almost any electronic communications device or service these days may
be fair game for electronic surveillance, some lawful, some not. Given
the somewhat archaic nature of our electronic privacy laws, we are
largely left to do what we can to safeguard the privacy of our own
electronic information. Questions remain as to whether the data we
transmit over the Internet will be afforded a “reasonable expectation of
privacy” under electronic privacy laws should it fall into inappropriate
hands.
Finally, Congress must determine how far it wants to allow the law
enforcement community to push the electronic surveillance envelope in
the name of national security and public safety. The time has come for
Congress to address the increscent conflict between our outdated
electronic privacy laws, modern communications technology, individual
privacy rights, and legitimate law enforcement needs. Without relevant
changes in legislation to fit present day technology, courts will continue
to render their own interpretations of federal laws, resulting in an
uncertain and inconsistent legal landscape in which bad facts will
increasingly dictate individual privacy rights. This confusing and
uncertain legal landscape makes compliance with the law difficult if not
impossible.223 Absent legislative guidance, law enforcement officials
may establish the standards for us, continuing to expand electronic
surveillance activities to a degree not contemplated by the original laws
or supported by the majority of the people.

223
See id. at 367 (“A provider’s subjective good-faith belief that its actions are lawful is
not enough to immunize it from liability.”). In addition, even when the surveillance
statutes and company privacy policies clearly permit a communications provider to release
information voluntarily, there may be some unwanted consequences of doing so. Id. “No
provision in the statutes entitles companies to ‘uninvite’ the government after an
investigation has begun.” Id. at 372.
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